Whilst the benefits of forward contracting for goods and services have been extensively researched in terms of mitigating market power effects in spot markets, we analyse how the risk in spot price formation induces a counteracting premium in the contract prices. We consider and test a wide-ranging set of propositions, involving fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and shock components, on a long data set from the most liquid of European electricity forward markets, the EEX. We show that much of what is conventionally regarded as the market price of risk in electricity is actually that of its underlying fuel commodity, gas; that market power has a double effect on prices, insofar as it increases spot prices and induces a forward premium; that oil price sentiment spills over and that the premium reacts to scarcity and the higher moments of spot price uncertainty. We observe that considerations of the scale and determinants of the forward premium are at least as important as the market power effects in spot market price formation when evaluating the efficiency of wholesale power trading.
Introduction
In fully liberalised wholesale electricity markets, as with most commodities, trading in forwards and futures constitutes a substantially higher volume than physical demand. For example in 2008, churn 3 ratios of about 8 and 7 were reported for the German and Nordic markets, and in Britain, over 90% of the power delivered was via forward contracts with maturities of between a month and two years (Ofgem, 2009) . Given the intense scrutiny of wholesale electricity markets by regulatory and competition authorities, questions of the efficiency and determinants of the realised premia in these forward prices, i.e. the systematic difference between the forward price and the associated subsequent spot price(s), are therefore at least as relevant as those regarding the exercise of market power on the spot market itself (EC, 2007 (EC, , 2008 . Furthermore, in considering the efficiency of retail prices, regulators are increasingly recognising the extent of hedging decisions by utilities and thus benchmarking or regulating retail profit margins with reference to forward rather than spot prices (Ofgem, 2010 , Omel, 2010 .
Whilst forward markets clearly promote market completeness, facilitate the necessary risk management 4 , and in theory induce greater competitive behaviour on the spot markets (Bushnell et al., 2008) , the transaction costs (premia) that emerge may well erode some of these benefits in practice 5 . Thus, in cases where forward and spot market conduct has been 3 investigated by competition authorities, the question of determining fair values for the forward premia as counterfactuals inevitably arise (Christensen et al., 2007) .
However, identifying and estimating the components of the premia implied by forward prices has remained, despite an increasing amount of research, a challenging and relatively unresolved area of analysis. Whilst research has been quite widely undertaken documenting the empirical properties of electricity forward premia and proposing stylized equilibrium models (references in the next section), testing the causal factors of the realised premia has not been specified as widely as the complexity and interrelatedness of the price drivers require. From a taxonomy of propositions, therefore, we have sought to provide a more complete multi-factor analysis of the empirical determinants of the forward premium and their implications. Within the wider context of the financial behaviour of energy derivatives, we focus particularly upon the characteristics of electricity that render its forward price formation rather special.
Firstly, as a product, wholesale electricity is a "flow" rather than a "stock"; it is produced and consumed instantaneously and continuously. This results in a wide range of traded products of different maturities and delivery periods, e.g. for the British market, where the spot market is settled against half-hourly trading periods throughout the day, the APX power exchange 6 offers forward products ranging from blocks of two and four hours for daily maturities to various peak (e.g. 7am to 7pm) and baseload (midnight to midnight) contracts extending over delivery periods ranging from a day, week, month, quarter or a year, for up to three years ahead. This microstructure implies an absence of a 1:1 correspondence between forward and spot products, and, as a consequence, that forward premia evaluations are complicated by the averaging required over more extended delivery periods.
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A more crucial implication of this "flow" aspect is that the nonstorability of power precludes the classic cost of carry equilibrium of spot and forwards (Kaldor, 1939) . Instead it is usual to consider equilibrium in expectations and risk aversion (Keynes, 1930) amongst agents with heterogeneous needs for hedging spot price uncertainty. The forward price is thereby viewed as being determined as the expected spot price plus an ex ante market premium. However, as this ex ante premium is unobservable, empirical analysis looks instead at an ex post (realised) estimate, F t,T -S T, where F t,T is the forward price quoted at time t, for delivery at time T, whereupon the spot price turns out to be S T . Thus,
and the ex post forward premium clearly equals the ex ante premium FP t,T plus a random error ε t,T in the (rational) spot price expectation due to price relevant shocks, occurring between t and T. Electricity spot prices are well known to be characterised by high volatility and occasional spikes 7 , caused, structurally by the intersection of steeply increasing convex supply curves and, in the short term, price inelastic demand. Supply or demand shocks therefore lead to sudden rises in spot market prices. Formal models of asset pricing under risk can be adapted to electricity to associate, under risk neutrality, the emergence of this ex ante forward premium from a market price of risk (Kolos and Ronn, 2008) , but it is more usual to invoke concepts of risk aversion between producers and retailers resulting in the forward premium being the net hedging cost in the market (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002) .
Without appeal to a stylized equilibrium model, in focusing upon the realised (ex post) premium, to the extent that the random error distribution has zero mean, the realised premium is a consistent estimator of the ex ante premium. However, it does raise the important question in data analysis of how much of each ex post value reflects the price of risk and how much is 7 See for example, Lucia and Schwartz (2002) , Burger et al. (2004) , Huisman et al. (2007) , Kanamura and Ohashi (2008) , Karakatsani and Bunn (2008) , Bowden and Payne (2008) , Higgs and Worthington (2008). error in the rational expectation of the spot price. In a multi-factor analysis, this means that careful consideration needs to be given to variables that influence the forward price formation, known to the market at time t, and shocks to the drivers of the spot price that occur between t and T. In our analysis we give more consideration to this than previous studies. We take a reduced-form perspective seeking to interpret in detail the significant factors affecting the realised premium, which, since it does not require a theoretical counterfactual, would be taken as the basis of ex post market monitoring.
Another special feature of electricity as a commodity is that it is actually a derived commodity, insofar as in most electricity markets a substantial amount of the technologies use the conversion of gas, coal or oil, and furthermore these technologies tend to set the market price. Forecasts of electricity prices are strongly dependent upon those of the marginal fuels (mainly gas) and so an important, and as yet unaddressed question, is how much of the market price of risk is due to price formation in the electricity sector as such and how much is simply a supply-chain transmission of the risk premia in the underlying primary fuels.
The industry structure of the electricity sector itself gives rise to another special feature, in that electricity generation is usually a highly concentrated industry and as a consequence oligopoly pricing remains a serious concern (EC, 2007 (EC, , 2008 . Although a substantial amount of theoretical research (following Allaz, 1992) has suggested that forward contracting in a concentrated market may mitigate market power effects in the spot market, we know that market power raises spot prices (Weron, 2006) and it is an open question to what extent market concentration may compound this by inducing additional market power effects in the forward risk premium. We seek to address this as part of our multifactor analysis.
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This paper therefore proceeds as follows: The next section summarises related research in forward prices and positions our analysis. Section 3 introduces the market setting for our analysis and quantifies the realised ex post forward premia. Section 4 develops a propositional framework on the forward premia determinants. Section 5 presents the results of the econometric model-based analysis. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Research Background
Two quite different streams of equilibrium modelling in forward markets have been influential. One has focussed on the strategic effects of contracts in an oligopolistic risk neutral environment, following Allaz (1992) and Allaz and Vila (1993) , and the other on risk aversion in a competitive financial market environment, following the work of Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) . Allaz and Vila (1993) , using a two stage game, show how Cournot producers can be induced into forward commitments which in turn makes them behave more competitively in the spot market. With risk neutral and arbitrage free assumptions, this suggests lower prices than without a forward contracting opportunity. Although this procompetitive view of forward markets continues to be endorsed (Bushnell, 2007 (Bushnell, , et al., 2008 , the theoretical results become less clear when the simple two stage view of contracting is relaxed (e.g. Mahenc and Salanie, 2004; Green and Le Coq, 2010) .
From the other perspective, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) , using a Taylor series expansion of expected utility, suggest that the forward premium is a function of the variance (negative influence) and skewness (positive influence) of spot prices. Empirical confirmations of the significance of variance and skewness in the risk premia have been mixed, however.
Whilst Douglas and Popova (2008) confirm these for the PJM day-ahead forward market, others including Lucia and Torro (2008) , Botterud et al. (2009) for weekly contracts at the Nord Pool, Redl et al. (2009) for monthly contracts at the EEX and Nord Pool, and Furio and Meneu (2010) for monthly contracts in the Spanish electricity market find at best only partial support.
In general, descriptive research on forward premia show significant values, although signs vary by time of day and season. Longstaff and Wang (2004) , Hadsell and Shawky (2006) , Diko et al. (2006) , and Gjolberg and Johnsen (2001) , Weron (2008) Diko et al. (2006) find that the forward premium decreases as time to maturity for EEX peak load contracts decreases, whilst Benth et al. (2008) relate the term structure of the forward premium to the net hedging demand of consumers and producers (which they term as market power). Their model yields decreasing absolute values of forward premia (eventually getting negative) and market power estimates when time to maturity or delivery period length increase. These EEX price studies take the risk considerations of market participants as the source of the forward premium (implicitly assuming efficient spot price forecasts). Extending this, Redl et al. (2009) show that additionally supply and demand shocks can contribute to the explanation of the futuresspot difference as well as the conventional stochastic risk measures (variance and skewness of spot prices). 8
Market setting and Initial Data Analysis
We focus on month-ahead futures for several reasons. Firstly, this is the most liquid contract and most price data is available for futures with monthly delivery periods. Secondly, due to the near-term delivery period, the forecast errors of market participants should, on average, be low for up to one month ahead.
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More specifically, we consider only prices on the last trading day before the delivery month.
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Futures at the EEX are settled financially. For baseload the underlying is the mean of all hourly spot prices during the delivery period. For peak load the underlying is the Phelix peak load index, which is the mean of the peak hours from 8:00am to 8:00 pm from Monday to Friday during the delivery period.
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The European electricity market is still characterised by several (regional or national) wholesale price areas which is caused by, among others, limited cross-border transmission capacities. However, the Central/Western European market comprising Austria, Germany,
France and, to a certain extent, Switzerland is emerging to form the largest integrated reference market for power in Continental Europe. The EEX is the leading exchange in this extended region. In early 2007 implicit auctions between France, Belgium and the Netherlands were introduced leading to a coupling of these markets thereby effectively extending the Central European market and wholesale prices in the Czech Republic as well as
Poland have gradually reached the EEX level. Figure 1 depicts these price developments and shows this increasing convergence over time. For each monthly contract the relative ex-post difference between the forward price in the trading period and spot price in the delivery period is expressed as a ratio:
where Δ T is the relative difference between the forward and spot price, F t,T is either the average futures price in month t for delivery in T or the settlement price on the last trading day in month t for delivery in T and S T is the spot price average in month T. The differences between forward and corresponding spot prices are significant (see Figure 4) . Table 1 summarises some additional statistics. On a monthly average, base load contracts were traded 9% above actual spot prices in the delivery periods of the futures at EEX. Month-ahead peak load futures were traded at 12% above spot prices in the delivery period.
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Using futures prices on the last trading day instead of monthly averages for determination of the relative differences Δ T still yields significant positive errors (although the magnitude is lower). On the last trading day, base load contracts were traded 5% above actual spot prices in the delivery periods. Peak load futures were traded on the last trading day 7% above spot prices in the delivery period. The above analysis does not consider seasonalities in the (relative and absolute) forward premium. Figure 5 shows a seasonal graph of the relative differences for peak load. We note from visual inspection that a seasonal pattern in the forward premium seems to exist, being highest in January and lowest in the mid seasons April and September. However, seasonal effects were not statistically significant in our empirical analysis and are therefore not elaborated further. 
A Multifactor Propositional Framework
We have organised plausible forward premium components into fundamental influences, behavioural effects, market conduct, dynamic effects and shock effects:
Fundamental influences
 Fuels and their risk premia: Proposition: An increase in the gas forward premium is expected to increase the electricity forward premium, and the effect is anticipated to be more pronounced in peak load compared to base load.
Given the high importance of fossil fuelled generation technologies in the EEX market, the premium prevailing in the electricity contract market should be directly influenced by the premium in the gas market. A reduction in the reserve margin indicates relative scarcity and one would expect that this leads to a higher propensity for shocks to induce greater price volatility and 13 The price setting technologies in the peak load segment are gas fired. For base load, the coal market could similarly influence the electricity market. Still, there exists no coal spot market in the EEX region which precludes the calculation of corresponding forward premia. Moreover, with the introduction of carbon trading, gas fired power plants have gained increased importance also in the base load segment. 14 The reserve margin as ratio of generation and demand constitutes a measurement for scarcity in the electricity supply system. (2002) predict a negative effect. It could be argued however, that, due to the convexity of the 15 It would be reasonable to suggest a nonlinear effect of the reserve margin given the convexity of the supply curve. However, our results did not differ when linear margin terms are replaced by quadratic ones. 16 In the light of adaptive expectations a further natural risk assessment parameter would be the corresponding realisation in the spot market of the same delivery month a year ago. Still, all 12-month lagged variables turned out to be statistically insignificant in our models.
supply curve, shocks that create high skewness and volatility are very similar and therefore in the risk premia regressions, these two moments should have similar signs. 
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suggests that the generators increase the spot market volatility in order to increase the forward premium in contracts. Furthermore, it is plausible to argue, similarly to Anderson and Hu (2008) , that producers who can increase spot market prices demand a higher premium to contract forward 18 and that buyers see generator market power as an additional risk factor which increases their willingness to pay forward premia.
The estimation of reliable forward market concentration proxy variables, which would allow empirical insights into market power, is, however, quite elusive in the absence of detailed contract data. On the other hand, estimated base load and peak load price mark ups above marginal cost estimates for the spot market can be included in the analysis. If, ceteris paribus, consumption is unexpectedly high in the delivery month spot prices should exceed forward prices due to a decreasing margin. On the other hand, if, ceteris paribus, total generation rises unexpectedly spot prices should fall below forward prices since the supply curve is shifted to the right. Hence, the regression coefficient associated with the realised margin is expected to show a positive sign. 
Analysis of the ex post forward premium
We develop reduced form models to give insights on the above propositions. Furthermore, the analysis assumes myopic expectations in the sense that the market participants are influenced by current and historic events on the spot market. These events, in turn, contribute to the risk and market assessment of the agents and, hence, to the forward premium. All parameters except the margin shock are observable for the market participants on the last trading day of month t.
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We analyse both base load and peak load forward contracting.
Base load
Sequentially minimising the AIC criterion, pursuing a general-to-specific model identification characterised by all variables discussed in section 4, yields the following equation for the ex post baseload forward premium:
where F t,T -S T is the ex post forward premium, F t,T is the futures price on the last trading day in month t for delivery in month T, S T is the spot price average in month T, c v (S t ) is the coefficient of variation of daily spot prices in month t, c v (Brent t ) is the coefficient of variation of daily Brent spot prices in month t, FP Gas t-1,t is the realised gas forward premium of a month ahead futures for month t, Margin t is the realised ratio of generation and consumption in month t, Basis t is the difference between the futures price on the last trading day in month t for delivery in month T (F t,T ) and the spot price average in month t (S t ), and Margin T is the margin shock in month T. Results for the corresponding model are shown in Table 3 .
The significant positive influence of volatility in the oil market confirms the "sentiment" importance of the oil market for energy commodities in general. Interestingly, its influence is as important as the influence of the volatility on the electricity market itself (in terms of statistical significance). Similarly, the economic responsiveness is very high with an average elasticity of 2.4. Hence, a one percentage increase of the oil market volatility causes a 2.4% change of the electricity forward premium. The volatility of electricity spot prices positively influences the futures price and, hence, the forward premium. The influence of the spot price volatility on the forward premium is in general agreement with the empirical literature cited in section 2 but in previous research the sign of this measure seems to be indeterminate. In our case the sign is positive which is opposite to Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) but conforms 21 to our proposition.
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The forward premium responds highly to a change in the electricity market volatility with an average elasticity of 4. Table 3 . Results of regression analysis (3) for ex post forward premia of month-ahead baseload futures at EEX for monthly delivery periods (t-statistics in brackets). All tests are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Results are shown for premia determined by futures prices on the last trading day. *, **, *** denotes significance on the 10%, 5% and 1%-level.
Realised premia in the gas market influence the electricity premia, although at a weak 14% significance level only. Still, given the expected sign, this variable is an interesting indication of the increasing importance of gas fired power plants in EEX baseload.
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On scarcity, if market participants perceive a decreasing reserve margin in the spot market, measured as the ratio of available generation to consumption, the forward premium increases, as expected. The significant positive influence of the basis (i.e. the current forward-spot difference) gives further insight into the adaption expectation formation of the market participants. Upward 22 Note that in our analysis volatility is measured via the coefficient of variation -and not via variance. Among others, this is motivated by allowing a better comparison between different "informational sources" of volatility for market actors (i.e. oil and power market volatility). 23 For comparison, Redl et al. (2009) have shown that generation costs of gas fired power plants influence yearahead baseload futures prices at the EEX significantly.
trends in the, to a certain extent, tied spot and forward price series yield an increasing basis.
This, in turn, results in an increasing forward premium. Hence, the dynamics of the spot market are reflected in the forward premium. Finally, the margin shock coefficient gives the expected sign and is statistically significant. Therefore, this variable can assess misjudgements of future supply and demand conditions and captures some of the forecast error part of the forward premium defined by equation (1).
Peak load
A similar procedure to the above described one yields the following equation for the ex post peak load forward premium:
where F t,T -S T is the ex post forward premium, F t,T is the peak load futures price on the last trading day in month t for delivery during peak hours in month T, S T is the peak load spot price average in month T, Skew(S t ) is the skewness of daily spot prices in month t, Spike 2sd t is the count of spikes outside of 2 standard deviations of the mean spot price in month t, FP Gas t-1,t is the realised gas forward premium of a month ahead futures for month t, Spot market power t is the ratio of the spot price in month t and the fundamental marginal cost estimate for month t, Margin t is the ratio of regional generation and demand in month t, Basis t is the difference between the futures price on the last trading day in month t for delivery in month T (F t,T ) and the spot price average in month t (S t ), and Margin T is the margin shock in month T. Results for the corresponding model are shown in Table 4 .
Realised premia in the gas market, as expected, have a significantly positive effect on the electricity peak load premia. The price setting technologies in peak load hours are, in fact, gas fired power plants. The significant positive influence of gas premia confirms the importance 23 of these generation technologies although the electricity premium reacts in economic terms inelastically to changes in the gas premium with an elasticity of 0.15. The skewness of spot prices positively influences forward premia for peak load. If the observed spot price skewness increases by one percentage point the forward premium increases by 0.4%. Positively skewed spot prices increase the hedging demand of retailers given fixed retail prices. On the other hand, they represent opportunity costs of generators having sold forward. Both factors contribute to a positive forward premium, as suggested by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) . However, we observe a negative influence of the number of price spikes occurring in the spot market, which may initially appear counterintuitive, but in the context of a significant skewness coefficient suggests that for given skewness, a smaller number of high spikes may have more effect on the premia than a larger number of "moderate" spikes. Table 4 . Results of regression analysis (4) for ex post forward premia of month-ahead peak load futures at EEX for monthly delivery periods (t-statistics in brackets). All tests are based on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. Results are shown for premia determined by futures prices on the last trading day. *, **, *** denotes significance on the 10%, 5% and 1%-level.
On scarcity, if market participants perceive a decreasing margin in the spot market, as measured by the ratio of available generation to consumption, the forward premium increases.
A decreasing margin is related to the increased likelihood of spikes occurring in the spot market and, due to the convex supply curve, an increased skewness of spot prices. It is also this close interrelation between the fundamental state of the system (margin) and higher moments and parameters characterising the spot price distribution (skewness, price spikes) which makes the specification of the functional form and its interpretation delicate.
Interestingly, the forward premium is positively influenced by the market power estimate. In fact, spot price mark ups yield increases in the forward premium. This can be caused by a higher willingness to pay of the buyers, which price generator market power as a risk factor, and compensation demanded by dominant producers to be willing to sell forward (Anderson and Hu, 2008) . This result suggests, that any (positive) procompetitive effect of forward markets is, in fact, counteracted to some degree by an increased risk premium. The economic importance of this result is reinforced by the elasicity of the premium: if the mark up above marginal costs in the spot market increases by 1% the forward premium increases by 0.9%.
We are not aware of any other study having empirically assessed this effect. Upward common trends in the spot and forward price series yield an increasing basis. This, in turn, results in an increasing forward premium which is reflected in a significant regression coefficient. Finally, the scarcity shock coefficient shows the expected sign and is statistically significant. This variable captures as in the baseload case, the forecast error part of the forward premium.
A number of specification variations were tried without revealing useful results. It seems that the margin shock variable is sufficient to capture both demand and supply shocks. Because of endogeniety concerns and the difficulty of specifying demand for a market which has high interconnection to neighbours, we took an average central European temperature as a proxy, but this proved not to be significant, nor did an analysis of the effect of temperature surprises (actual monthly average in the delivery month minus long term ex ante monthly average). On the supply side, although Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) found that EEX forward premia can be partly explained by the volatility of CO2 spot price returns, we found that it had no incremental value beyond being embedded in the volatility of electricity spot prices 24 .
Conclusion
We have introduced a multifactor analysis of electricity forward premia components to give insights into some important propositions on the electricity forward premium. In general we have shown several significant new effects:
 We have controlled for the ex post nature of the analysis by including a margin shock variable in the regressions, and this was indeed significant in both the peak and baseload monthly ex post risk premia.
 We have demonstrated that as a derived commodity, electricity translates a substantial amount of the underling fuel's market price of risk (i.e. much of the peak forward premium is in fact due to the gas market).
 We have shown that as part of the energy commodity trading bundle, oil market sentiment spills over, in that increased oil price volatility increases the forward premium.
 Market power appears to have a double influence on wholesale prices -in addition to its potential effect on spot prices, it increases the forward premium. It seems therefore that whilst the theoretical effect of forward contracting may be to make the spot market more competitive, generators are able to compensate for this through a higher forward premium. 25 24 Reassuringly, the inclusion of carbon price volatility resulted in an insignificant regression coefficient. Apart from the volatility of CO2 prices affecting the electricity forward premium the latter could also be influenced by the premium in the CO2 market. However, there are no month-ahead CO2 contracts traded. 25 The theoretical model of Allaz and Villa (1993) indicated an increase in physical supply of 20% compared to the no contract case, and in a similar way Green (1999) estimates, in a numerical example, price decreases of 25% when comparing fully contracted to uncontracted firms. The extensive analyses by Bushnell (2007 Bushnell ( , et. al., 2008 suggests price decreases of around 50% when firms' contract positions are considered against a theoretical counterfactual. This contrasts with actual empirical studies reporting significant positive forward premia: Longstaff and Wang (2004) show for the PJM day ahead market premia up to 14%. Botterud et al. (2009) report  The effects of scarcity (reserve margin), spot volatility and skewness were significant and consistent with propositions on the positive effects of market risk aversion.
Overall, the forward premium in electricity is a rather complex function of fundamental, behavioural, dynamic, market conduct and shock components. It is clearly an oversimplification in practice to analyse it only in terms of the stochastic properties of the spot prices (variance and skewness). Only part of the risk can be attributed to the electricity sector per se, but in that, risk aversion to scarcity, volatility and extreme events, as well as behavioural adaptation and oil sentiment spillovers characterises agent behaviour.
Furthermore, market concentration appears to translate market power effects into the risk premium, which may have important market monitoring implications since forward markets have, so far, been considered to be procompetitive.
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The reserve margin plays a crucial role since increased scarcity increases spot prices (which is amplified in the case of concentrated markets) and, moreover, also the forward premium. Hence, consumers take a "double hit" if the margin reduces, and if this is due to strategic withholding, then it is an important anti-trust concern. In general, some of the insights presented here suggest that forward premia should be considered key elements of a transaction cost analysis of market efficiency in power trading.
Finally, the analysis purposely relied on variables which are observable for the market actors on the forward trading day.
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As some of the fundamental market data is publicly available only on a monthly basis, the definition of the forward premium on the last trading day is particularly attractive for analysis. A more thorough investigation of the dynamic interrelations between current spot and forward prices (and premia) would, however, benefit for the Nord Pool market baseload premia from 1.3 to 4.4% for one week to six weeks ahead. Similarly, Redl et al. (2009) determine Nord Pool baseload premia of 8% for month-ahead contracts and EEX month-ahead premia of 9% for baseload and 13% for peak load. 26 See Anderson and Hu (2008) for a similar argument arising from a theoretical equilibrium model. 27 We argued that due to difficulties associated with forming month-ahead (or even longer) spot price forecasts it is very likely that the bidding behaviour on the forward market is affected by current events on the spot market.
27 from the higher granularity of daily representations or even higher frequency impact studies of news on forward prices.
